Titanic v Costa Concordia

By Capt. A. K. Bansal

On April 15, 1912, TITANIC foundered after hitting an iceberg while cruising at full speed in the North Atlantic. Out of 2,224 lives on board, 1,514 lives were lost. It was reported that RMS Californian was only a few miles away, but she did not receive Titanic’s SOS. Her radio officer was off duty.

White Star Line had planned weekly service between Southampton and New York. Bush telegraph and galley news amongst seafarers was that owners wanted to win the Atlantic Blue Ribbon on her maiden voyage and the master was on a great circle track to reach New York in the shortest possible time. Titanic was warned of pack ice ahead by radio. The radio officer who sent this message was rebuked by Titanic’s senior wireless operator for sending useless messages and this warning was never sent to the navigating bridge of Titanic. She also received a series of warnings from other ships of drifting ice in the area of Grand Banks of Newfoundland but continued to steam at full speed in the belief that iceberg posed little danger to the world’s largest ship.

She hit an iceberg, breaching five watertight compartments below the waterline and foundered bow first, with water spilling from compartment to compartment as her angle in the water increased. As per Board of Trade regulations, she had 16 lifeboats for only 1,178 people. The psyche of the time was that lifeboats were intended to ferry survivors from a sinking ship to a rescuing ship. As White Star Line did not have permanent crew, the vast majority of its 885 seafarers came on board a few hours before sailing. Therefore her new crew did not even know how to carry out evacuation and how many persons they could allow safely in each lifeboat. Also due to the tradition of ‘women and children first’, most lifeboats were launched only partially filled. Result was loss of 90% of men who were plunged into lethally cold water, to die within minutes.

Obviously this disaster was direct result of steaming into a dangerous area at too high a speed. This resulted in SOLAS 1914 which introduced new rules including provision of lifeboats for every life on board, that lifeboat drills were to be properly carried out etc.

Titanic disaster was not the only one through over confidence as it was generally believed that such a huge great ship could not be harmed by an iceberg. 100 years later, grounding of cruise liner Costa Concordia on January 14, 2012 was reported, with over 4,000 lives on board, through over confidence, daredevilry and in compliance with implied or expressed wishes of owners.

Cruising from Civitavecchia to Savona, her computer-controlled course was set to safely pass 5 miles off Giglio Island. It was reported that the Master decided to show a ‘sail past’ to these islanders, sailing very close to the Island. The ship hit the most seaward rock south of the entrance to Giglio harbour at full speed. She tore a 160 ft gash on her port side 26 feet below water, took a 70 degree list and capsized.

Press reported that Master admitted that he deviated from the computer-set course to pass close to the Island but stated that the management had told him to do so as it was good for tourism and that he had done it before but during daytime. He is also reported to have admitted that he had switched off the sound and visual warning signals while passing so close to the Island. There were many allegations against him. He even left the ship before evacuation was completed. Several passengers complained that the new crew did not know how to launch lifeboats.

The ethos of the sea is that the Master has to exercise utmost discretion and professional judgment to protect passengers safely regardless of what owners say and want. That does not appear to have been done in both Titanic and Costa Concordia, 100 years apart, even though most lives were saved on the Concordia. The maritime world boasts of rules and laws for safety of shipping, but not much seems to have changed over a century.

ISM Code is in force from 1998 with a blueprint for the way shipping companies should manage and operate ships and ensure that safety is given priority. IMO conventions apply to 97 percent of world shipping. But do its 170 Member States, 60 non-government and 30 intergovernmental organizations plus a few thousand ship owners comply with them in spirit except on paper? Do those responsible to enforce STCW Convention 1978 and its 2010 revision comply with it except on paper? Do Governments of countries who have ratified the conventions and have hundreds of ships under their flags comply with them except on paper? Do ship owners who give lip service to them comply with them except on paper?

It is well known to every seafarer that most of it is used for slogan shouting to achieve self-aggrandizement, NOT safety or clean environment. Therefore the maritime world must go beyond paper compliance with conventions and regulations and find industry-wide mechanisms to ensure that safety culture is embedded in our psyche throughout the industry, especially in the minds of those who man ships. Let us have a look at the immediate past despite all such conventions, laws and rules, and see what the International Maritime Community has learnt, done and achieved.

MARPOL 73/78 is one thing. But to abide by its provisions depends on owners and seafarers on board. A ship arrives in port and Chief Engineer requests a barge to pump out her full bilges. Boss from the office has no intention to supply a barge as it costs money but keeps on promising to do so. Come sailing day, he puts up his hands by saying that he tried his best but the port could not give him a barge and requests the Chief Engineer not to delay the ship but sail. Chief Engineer sails and pumps out his bilges at sea when he thinks that no one is looking. Log book entry is fudged. So what about MARPOL?

There has been a recent case when starboard lifeboat of a cargo ship was damaged by a passing mobile crane when the ship was alongside in a safe harbour. Master immediately telephoned his bosses who told him to cover the lifeboat, NOT to report the damage and sail without delay. Lifeboat will be repaired at her next port. Master obeyed and sailed. So what about SOLAS, his responsibility to life on board and owner’s responsibility not to sail an unseaworthy ship out of a safe harbour?

There has been a recent case of grounding of M.V. Royal Majesty when all three of her navigators were repeatedly warned on VHF by fishing boats, including their own lookouts, that their ship was off course. But no one looked out of the window. Each duty officer, snug inside his closed, A/C bridge, sat looking at his electronic chart coupled to GPS, which showed the ship on course and each of them including the master relied only on it. Unknown to them, GPS connection had come off its socket 26 hours earlier and the electronic display in her chart room showed only her DR position. So what about keeping proper lookout under ROR? Or, for that matter, what about listening to your own lookout who is reporting sighting high red lights to port, which should not have been seen had the ship been on her proper course? What about use of Loran, an alternate navigation equipment provided on board under the rules, to recheck her position, at least once during the voyage?

Another case of bad lookout has been reported recently when two ships collided because second officers of both ships approaching each other were glued to their radar sets and talking to each other on VHF, in clear visibility, without looking out of the window to see how the side lights of one opened to the other. So what about keeping lookout by ALL AVAILABLE means in compliance with ROR? All these disasters happened inspite of conventions, rules and laws and inspite of latest electronic navigation equipment fitted on board ships. Question is WHY?

A US-based ship surveyor was found guilty of certifying a ship safe for sea when she was actually taking in water. It was subsequently discovered that her exhaust and fuel were also pouring into the engine room, endangering crew and the ship. So what about surveyor’s responsibility to ship and crew under various rules and conventions?

An Italian shipping company and its chief engineer were found conniving to discharge oily seawater directly into the sea. And a New Zealand fishing company has been found conniving in making false entries in the oil record book. So where does compliance end, conniving start and illegality begin?

We can have whatever conventions we like, whatever regulations we can make and whatever restrictions we can impose. But till such time that we can ensure that ship owners comply with them and seafarers on board ships are competent, diligent, reliable and ethical, such accidents will continue to happen. This can only be achieved with high penalties on ship owners and strict, sincere and systematic training and education of seafarers. This is not just a matter of getting a certificate of competency but also to make sure that it is not just a piece of paper but that we are competent to hold it.

Rumours are rife that to obtain a certificate of competency today is only a matter of how much money is to be paid to the examiner. How much of it is true no one knows. But there can be no smoke without fire.

Fact also remains that ethics of the profession need to be improved. Pride in seafaring needs to be inculcated amongst seafarers. Above all, they have to be trained and convinced that loyalty to their ship and life on board is more important than loyalty to owners. THAT, more than IMC, more than conventions, rules and laws, will achieve safety, security and efficiency. IMO can make rules, but to abide by them depends on us seafarers. We must remember that no owner, charterer or manager can own, manage and run a ship without seafarers, both afloat and ashore. Therefore once we decide NOT to break rules or jeopardize our ships or life, no one can force us to do so. If we don’t treat our profession right we cannot blame anyone else for its woes. A surveyor can issue a crisp new seaworthiness certificate, but he cannot force a Master to sail and endanger life.

International Maritime Community keeps harping on the ratio between number of ships completing safe voyages to the number of accidents, as it does not want its critics to construe that no real progress has been made in accident avoidance in the last hundred years. But that is nothing but voices of vested interests.

As mentioned above, there are cases about surveyors issuing false certificates and seafarers and owners conniving at fudging records in different parts of the world. Fact remains that seafaring skills, professionalism as also professional pride in doing one’s job right, have taken a beating. Question is why should a master violate an International convention and put his own professionalism on the line just because ship owner tells him on telephone to do so? And THAT also without there being any record of such an order having been given!? Why should a marine surveyor who is also a seafarer, issue false certificates in respect of an unseaworthy ship, put his own name on the line and put the ship at risk just to please a ship owner who holds the purse strings!? Why should owners connive with surveyors and Masters of ships to fudge certificates for their own purposes? Answer lies with SEAFARERS. The profession, ships and lives on board should not be compromised the way it has become increasingly evident.