Convenience fee kept by ticket platform is not commission, says the Mumbai Tribunal

PVR INOX Limited v. DCIT (ITAT Mumbai)

The Price of a Click

Anyone who has booked a cinema ticket online knows the convenience fee. The ticket has a face value. At the point of payment, a separate charge is added for the use of the booking platform. The customer pays both together, and the platform passes the ticket price on to the cinema. For the customer, the difference between the two parts may seem small. For tax purposes, it can matter a great deal, because it decides whether tax has to be deducted at source on the fee that the platform keeps.

If the platform is treated as the cinema operator’s agent, and the fee it keeps is treated as the operator’s commission, the operator may have to deduct tax at source under section 194H of the Income-tax Act, 1961. If the platform is instead an independent business that serves its own customers, there is no commission and no such duty. That was the question before the Mumbai Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in PVR INOX Limited v. DCIT, decided on 31 August 2026. The Revenue treated the convenience fee retained by the platform as a constructive payment of commission by the cinema operator. The Tribunal rejected that view.

The Tribunal held that the cinema operator was under no duty to withhold tax on the convenience fee retained by the ticketing company. Section 194H needs a person who acts on behalf of another, and the Tribunal found no such relationship on the facts. The doctrine of constructive payment, on which the Revenue relied, could not create one.

The decision matters to the many businesses that sell through digital platforms. It confirms that a commercial relationship, and even contractual controls, do not by themselves create an agency. The relationship has to be looked at as a whole, and the question of who bears which risks is central to that exercise.

This article looks at the facts, the arguments of both sides and the reasoning of the Tribunal. It also notes the limits of the decision. The aim is to explain the reasoning in plain terms, so that businesses can apply it to their own contracts.

The Facts: Two Components of a Single Payment

The Indian company, now PVR INOX Limited, operated multiplexes and cinema theatres. It had an agreement with a company that ran an online ticket-booking platform, called the ticketing company in the ruling. The proceedings concerned the assessment year 2013-14 and arose under the withholding provisions of the 1961 Act.

Customers booked tickets on the ticketing company’s digital platform and paid online. The amount collected had two parts. One was the face value of the ticket, which the Indian company decided. The other was a separate convenience fee for the online booking facility. The customer paid both in one transaction, and the platform collected the money first.

The ticketing company sent the full ticket price to the Indian company. It also sent a fixed share of the convenience fee, which was Rs. 7.25 per ticket, and kept the rest of the fee for itself. The Indian company raised invoices for that fixed share, and on it the ticketing company deducted tax under section 194C of the 1961 Act.

The Revenue said that the ticketing company sold cinema tickets on behalf of the Indian company. On that view, the fee kept by the ticketing company was a constructive payment of commission by the Indian company, which should have deducted tax under section 194H. The Revenue relied on three things: a CBDT Circular of 1991, the Supreme Court’s ruling in J.B. Boda & Co., and some clauses of the agreement that, in its view, showed the Indian company’s control over the convenience fee charged to customers.

The Revenue’s theory had a clear structure. The Indian company set the ticket price. The agreement put a ceiling on the convenience fee, which could be changed only with mutual approval. The ticketing company collected money that, in the Revenue’s view, belonged first to the Indian company, and then kept a part of it as pay for selling tickets.

The Indian company answered that it had never paid or credited any convenience fee to the ticketing company. It received the whole ticket price and a fixed share of the fee, and the ticketing company kept the balance for its own service to its own customers. According to the Indian company, the basic condition for section 194H was missing, because the ticketing company did not act on its behalf. Without agency there could be no commission, and so no duty to deduct tax.

The Relevant Provisions and the Test of On Behalf Of

Section 194H requires tax to be deducted on payments of commission. For this purpose, commission includes any payment received or receivable by a person acting on behalf of another person for services rendered. The key words are acting on behalf of another. They describe the relationship the section is concerned with.

The CBDT Circular of 1991 deals with a particular case. Where a consignee or agent keeps its commission or brokerage and does not send it to the consignor or principal along with the sale proceeds, the retained commission is treated as a constructive payment to the agent, and tax must be deducted under section 194H.

The CBDT Circular of 2016 deals with advertising agencies. It says that the fees retained by an agency from a media company for booking advertisements are not commission under section 194H, because the relationship between the media company and the agency is that of principal to principal. Courts such as the Allahabad High Court in Jagran Prakashan had taken the same view.

These provisions share one foundation. Commission presupposes agency. The 1991 Circular explains how payment is made where an agency already exists. The 2016 Circular accepts that where there is no agency, there is no commission. So the first task in any such dispute is to decide whether the payee acts for the payer at all.

The Tribunal began with the words of the section. For section 194H to apply, the payee must act on behalf of another person. The phrase is not a formality. It shifts the inquiry from the flow of money to the nature of the relationship. A payment may pass through several hands, and one party may keep part of it, without any of them acting for the others. The question is not who held the money, but in what capacity.

The Tribunal then looked at the agreement clause by clause, to see whether the parties dealt with each other as principals or as agent and principal. It found four indicators. These are the heart of the decision, and each is worth a closer look.

Reading the Agreement: Principal to Principal

First, the agreement divided consumer claims, third-party liabilities, intellectual property rights and other risks between the parties according to their own responsibilities. Each bore the results of its own sphere of activity, as independent businesses do.

Secondly, the ticketing company guaranteed payment to the Indian company whether or not it recovered the money from customers, and it had to pay interest on any delay. The risk of non-collection therefore sat with the ticketing company and not with the Indian company. This is a mark of a party trading on its own account.

Thirdly, the ticketing company ran an independent digital platform. It dealt with the platform’s users as its own customers, owned the customer data, and could run promotions on its own account and at its own commercial risk. It was not just carrying out the directions of the Indian company as its marketing or ticketing agent.

Fourthly, the ceiling on the convenience fee and the need for mutual approval to change it were commercial safeguards. They did not show that the whole convenience fee first belonged to the Indian company and that the ticketing company later kept a part of it as pay for acting on the Indian company’s behalf.

Taken together, these factors pointed one way. The ticketing company was a separate business with its own platform, its own customers, its own risks and its own revenue. The Indian company was one of the many theatres whose tickets it sold. Each party earned from its own function, and neither acted as the other’s agent. The Tribunal therefore saw a principal-to-principal relationship.

This is also how most platform arrangements work in practice. A platform that lists many suppliers, serves many users and carries its own risk is building its own business. Its link with each supplier is a commercial deal between two enterprises, each pursuing its own interests. A tax rule should follow that reality, and the Tribunal’s approach does so. It looks at what each party does, what risk it carries and whom it serves, and not at the name given to the arrangement in the papers.

Why Risk Allocation Matters

Of the four factors, the guarantee of payment is perhaps the most telling. In a classic agency, the principal bears the commercial risk of the transaction. If the agent sells on credit and the buyer defaults, the loss falls on the principal.

The agent’s pay rewards its effort. It does not cover the principal’s risks. The arrangement in this case reversed that allocation. The ticketing company had to pay the Indian company whether or not it collected from customers, and it bore interest for any delay. It stood to lose if customers did not pay.

That is the conduct of a party trading on its own account, not of an agent passing through its principal’s money. The ownership of customer data points the same way. A platform that treats users as its own customers, controls the data they create and markets to them at its own risk is building its own business. Its relationship with the cinema is a deal between two enterprises.

These points also explain why the retained fee was not a payment from the cinema operator. The cinema operator never owned the convenience fee. Customers paid it to the ticketing company for the ticketing company’s own service, which was the use of its booking facility. The cinema operator neither paid nor credited it to anyone. There was therefore no payment by the operator to tax.

Risk, customer ownership and the right to earn from one’s own service are practical tests. They are easier to apply than a search for a label such as agent or partner, and a contract can be tested against them. The same questions can be asked of any platform in any sector.

Control Is Not the Same as Agency

The Revenue’s reliance on the ceiling on the convenience fee raised a familiar issue. Commercial agreements often contain controls that one party places on the other. A brand owner may limit how a distributor presents its goods.

A franchisor may set standards for a franchisee. A cinema operator may want to make sure that its customers are not charged excessive booking fees by a platform that sells its tickets. Such controls protect reputation and customer relations. They do not by themselves mean that the controlling party is the principal.

The Tribunal treated the ceiling and the mutual approval requirement as commercial safeguards. It declined to infer from them that the convenience fee belonged in the first instance to the Indian company. A limit on what a platform may charge is a different thing from an instruction to an agent on how to sell. The first protects an interest. The second directs a person who acts for another.

The distinction is important. If every contractual control were treated as evidence of agency, almost every distribution or platform arrangement could be called an agency, and section 194H would reach far beyond its intended scope. Parties would have to deduct tax on margins that were never commission.

The Tribunal also held that the Revenue’s reliance on the CBDT Circular of 1991 and on J.B. Boda & Co. was misplaced. Neither dispensed with the basic need to show that the recipient acted as an agent of the person said to be the principal. The Tribunal added that constructive payment is only a mode of satisfying an existing payment obligation. It cannot create the underlying obligation, or an agency relationship, where none is otherwise shown.

Put simply, the Circular and the Supreme Court’s ruling tell us how an agent’s commission is treated. They do not tell us who is an agent. That question must be answered first. The Tribunal’s approach keeps the two questions apart, and that is why the result is sound.

Constructive Payment Cannot Create Agency

This is a precise and useful way to state the point, and it is worth looking at closely. Read together with the Circular, it settles the order of the inquiry.

The 1991 Circular covers a case in which a principal owes commission to its agent and the agent, instead of getting a separate payment, deducts the commission from the sale proceeds. In that case the retention is simply a convenient way of paying what is already owed. The Circular makes sure the method of payment does not defeat the duty to deduct tax.

But the Circular assumes the agency. It does not prove it. Where the relationship is principal to principal, no commission is owed, and so there is nothing to be paid constructively. To apply the Circular in such a case would turn its logic upside down. It would use a rule about the mode of payment to create an obligation that does not exist.

The Tribunal relied on the Bombay High Court’s rulings in Super Religare Laboratories and Piramal Healthcare, on the decision in Shanthala Enterprises, and on the CBDT Circular of 2016. The common thread in these authorities is that section 194H applies only where the relationship is one of principal and agent. Where the payee acts on its own account, with its own risks and its own customers, what it receives or keeps is not commission, however the arrangement is described.

The 2016 Circular is a close analogy. An advertising agency books space with a media company and keeps part of the amount as its fee. The CBDT itself accepts that this is not commission, because the agency deals with the media company as a principal. The Tribunal found that the same reasoning applied to the ticketing company, which dealt with the cinema operator as a principal and kept its fee for its own service.

The Tribunal’s Decision

The Mumbai Bench ruled in favour of the Indian company. It held that the convenience fee retained by the ticketing company was not commission within the meaning of section 194H, and that the Indian company was under no duty to withhold tax on it.

The Tribunal noted the four indicators of a principal-to-principal relationship. It also noted that the ticketing company, and not the Indian company, bore the risk of non-collection, and that the ceiling on the fee was a commercial safeguard. On that footing, the conditions of section 194H were not met.

The ruling follows a line of authority on the same question. The Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in Shanthala Enterprises had also looked at the convenience charges kept by a platform of this kind. The Mumbai Bench placed the present case in that line and added its own detailed reading of the agreement. The result is a reasoned ruling that rests on the facts of the contract.

Platform businesses will read the ruling closely. It does not say that a platform can never be an agent. It says that agency has to be shown, and that the movement of money alone does not show it. The Revenue has to look at who bears the risk, who owns the customer and who earns from which service. Where those answers point to an independent business, section 194H has nothing to work on. In the end, the ruling is a good example of how a Tribunal tests an arrangement against its own facts, one clause at a time. The ruling gives officers and taxpayers a clear checklist. It also shows the value of keeping complete records of how the platform and the cinema actually deal with each other.

Implications for Platform Businesses

The decision has significance well beyond the cinema industry. Many businesses now sell through platforms that collect payments, keep a fee and pass on the balance.

Food delivery, travel bookings, event ticketing and online marketplaces all use variations of this model. In each case, the duty to withhold tax will depend on the true relationship between the parties. The indicators that emerge from the ruling are who bears the risk of non-collection, who owns the customer relationship and the data it creates, whether the platform markets on its own account, and whether contractual controls are protective safeguards or directions to an agent. These are practical questions that can be answered from the contract and from the conduct of the parties.

For businesses, the decision underlines the importance of drafting agreements that reflect the real allocation of functions and risks. A platform agreement that calls the platform an agent, while in substance treating it as an independent business, may invite disputes. The label does not decide the result, but it can start the argument.

An agreement that clearly gives risk, customer ownership and responsibility to the platform will support a principal-to-principal view. Records matter as well. Invoices, remittance statements and settlement terms should match the contract, so that the commercial reality can be shown when an assessment or a withholding proceeding is opened. Businesses should also review older arrangements in the light of this ruling, and note any clause that could be read as an instruction to the platform to sell on their behalf.

Platforms and their partners should also check the other side of the same fee. Where a platform deducts tax under section 194C on the share it sends to a partner, the classification of that share, and of the fee it keeps, should be consistent across its contracts and invoices. Finally, businesses that sell through platforms should keep in mind that the answer can differ from contract to contract, so each agreement needs its own review.

A Cautious Reading: No Agency, No Commission

The ruling should not be read as holding that platforms can never be agents. Some platform arrangements may truly involve agency, for example where the platform sells strictly in the name of the supplier, bears no commercial risk and is paid by the supplier for its efforts. In such cases, section 194H may well apply. Whether an arrangement is an agency depends on its terms and on the conduct of the parties, and not on the name of the document.

The decision is also confined to section 194H. It does not decide how the arrangement is treated for other purposes, such as indirect tax or the specific withholding provisions that apply to transactions through electronic commerce operators. Those questions depend on their own words. Nor does the ruling stop the Revenue from examining the substance of a platform relationship. The wider lesson is to read each statutory provision for what it actually requires.

It confirms only that the examination must address the elements of agency. The existence of retention, or of a ceiling on fees, is not a substitute for that analysis. The Tribunal’s decision rests on a simple statutory base. Section 194H applies to payments to a person acting on behalf of another. If the payee does not act on behalf of the payer, the payment is not commission. In short, the Revenue must prove the relationship before it can claim the tax. Taxpayers, in turn, should be ready to show, with documents, that the platform acted on its own account.

The ticketing company did not act for the cinema operator. It ran its own platform, served its own customers, owned its own data, bore its own risks and guaranteed payment whatever it collected. The ceiling on the fee was a commercial safeguard, not an instruction to an agent. The doctrine of constructive payment could not change that. These facts show an independent trader serving its own market.

Constructive payment describes how an existing obligation may be discharged. It does not create an obligation, and it does not create an agency. For businesses that work through digital platforms, the ruling is a reminder that the tax result follows the relationship the arrangement really creates. For the Revenue, it confirms that withholding duties must rest on the statutory relationship and not on the movement of money alone. A charging provision applies to the facts as they are. Seen this way, the decision is both modest and useful. It does not change the law, but it clarifies how the law applies to a common business model. For the Revenue, the lesson is equally practical. An officer who wishes to apply section 194H to a platform fee should first record why the platform acts for the payer, and on what facts. No agency, no commission.