By Henry A. Kissinger
Sept. 11, 2001, is etched in American minds as a vast tragedy, but it is likely that history may record it as well as the turning point in shaping the international order for the 21st century. 11 ended some of the smug illusions of the 1990s, among them that international politics has been supplanted by global economics or by the Internet.
The idea that a uniting Europe should seek its identity in distinction from the United States has been overtaken by European offers to join the American diplomatic and military campaign against terrorism. Russia has become a partner in the anti-terrorism campaign. China has provided intelligence. Relations with India have grown closer despite America’s reliance on Pakistani bases in the war against Afghanistan.
The United States has made quiet overtures toward Iran. And the two defeated nations of World War II, Germany and Japan, have abandoned previous domestic constraints, Germany by sending troops beyond NATO’s boundaries, and Japan by deploying ships in the Indian Ocean far from home waters. None of these steps was conceivable six months earlier. To be sure, the motives are not necessarily congruent with each other.
Europe has recognized its vulnerability. President Vladimir Putin perceived (even before Sept. 11) that, to play a major international role, Russia needed to replace confrontation with cooperation with the United States. China has come to similar conclusions: that its overwhelming need for growth and reform was incompatible with avoidable tensions with the United States.
And India’s movement away from non-alignment has grown in tandem with its unease about its Muslim minority — the second largest Muslim population in the world. In short, the assault on America has brought home to the major powers how crucial America’s role is for the peace and stability of the world. As a result, the United States, for the first time in half a century, no longer faces a strategic adversary or any country, alone or in combination, capable of becoming one for at least the next decade. Nor do the other major powers perceive each other as strategic threats.
The danger for all of them comes not across frontiers but from terrorist cells implanted inside their countries, or from quarrels between secondary military powers. Nowhere is that new geopolitical promise more striking than in the relationship between America, Europe and Russia, the centerpiece of American foreign policy since the end of World War II Sept. 11 brought home the truth to Europe that a need for a common transatlantic security relationship remains. Within 48 hours of the terrorist attack, the NATO Council, for the first time in NATO existence, invoked Article 5 of the NATO ept.
11, 2001, is etched in American minds as a vast tragedy, but it is likely that history may record it as well as the turning point in shaping the international order for the 21st century. 11 ended some of the smug illusions of the 1990s, among them that international politics has been supplanted by global economics or by the Internet. The idea that a uniting Europe should seek its identity in distinction from the United States has been overtaken by European offers to join the American diplomatic and military campaign against terrorism. Russia has become a partner in the anti-terrorism campaign.
China has provided intelligence. Relations with India have grown closer despite America’s reliance on Pakistani bases in the war against Afghanistan. The United States has made quiet overtures toward Iran. And the two defeated nations of World War II, Germany and Japan, have abandoned previous domestic constraints, Germany by sending troops beyond NATO’s boundaries, and Japan by deploying ships in the Indian Ocean far from home waters.
None of these steps was conceivable six months earlier. To be sure, the motives are not necessarily congruent with each other. Europe has recognized its vulnerability. President Vladimir Putin perceived (even before Sept.
11) that, to play a major international role, Russia needed to replace confrontation with cooperation with the United States. China has come to similar conclusions: that its overwhelming need for growth and reform was incompatible with avoidable tensions with the United States. And India’s movement away from non-alignment has grown in tandem with its unease about its Muslim minority — the second largest Muslim population in the world. In short, the assault on America has brought home to the major powers how crucial America’s role is for the peace and stability of the world.
As a result, the United States, for the first time in half a century, no longer faces a strategic adversary or any country, alone or in combination, capable of becoming one for at least the next decade. Nor do the other major powers perceive each other as strategic threats. The danger for all of them comes not across frontiers but from terrorist cells implanted inside treaty authorizing collective self-defense. The end of Napoleon did not end the fears of a resurgent France.
The solution was the creation of the Quadruple Alliance. An analogous institutional framework is in order to address the contemporary challenge of Russia. Russia should become a full and equal partner in political discussions affecting international order. Relations with India have grown closer despite America’s reliance on Pakistani bases in the war against Afghanistan.